Are there enough missile interceptors?

THEY SOUND like low-flying planes, only louder, followed by dull booms rolling in from the east. Audible throughout central Israel seconds after sirens warn of incoming missiles from Iran, Arrow missile-interceptors are the soundtrack of the war for Israelis rushing to shelter. If the Arrows are not heard during an attack, rumours immediately start swirling. Are the valuable interceptors starting to run out?

The rumours were given fodder over the weekend when Semafor, an American website, reported that Israel had told the Trump administration it was running critically low on interceptors. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) denied the report, claiming there was no shortage and it was “prepared for prolonged combat”. Qatar had denied reports early in the war that its stocks were getting low. The actual number held by Israel or any other country with missile-defence systems is a closely guarded secret. Yet given the importance of interceptors for protecting civilians and critical infrastructure, their availability is a key factor in how long the war with Iran can last.

There are no available numbers of how many interceptors Israel has used since the campaign began. In the Gulf, which is much closer to Iran, two are usually launched against each incoming missile. By contrast, Israel’s system has more than ten minutes to judge whether missiles are headed for built-up areas and need to be intercepted. It has an array of interceptors of different ranges which allow just one to be used at higher altitude and then another lower down if the first fails. What’s more, some military experts believe the number of interceptors is not the main issue. One Israeli general refuses to elaborate on his country’s stocks but says that “the most critical elements are better radar and satellite tracking which provide the early-warning allowing civilians to reach shelter in time.”

Even so, there are reasons to believe interceptor stocks may be stretched. One is that the war began earlier and has lasted longer than the campaign Israel originally envisaged. It began planning another series of air strikes against Iran’s missile launchers and factories shortly after the end of the 12-day war in June. But it used hundreds of interceptors against more than 500 missiles Iran fired during that conflict. According to Israeli sources, the IDF had planned to wait to strike until the summer, when munitions stores, including interceptors, were expected to be fully replenished. But the protests that began in Iran at the end of December and Donald Trump’s rash promise to the demonstrators that “help is on its way”, as well as the opportunity to eliminate the Iranian leadership on February 28th, changed the schedule.

Another is the wide range of Iranian attacks. America has deployed additional THAAD and Patriot batteries to bolster the missile defences of its allies in Israel and the Gulf. Yet American and Israeli politicians and war planners have been surprised by the extent of attacks on civilian targets throughout the region and beyond, as far as Cyprus, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Defences have been further stretched by direct hits on a number of American radars tracking Iranian missiles, and by hundreds of Iranian drones, which can be knocked out with shorter-range methods, such as anti-aircraft cannons and electronic jamming, but which still add to the load. Missiles and drones launched from Lebanon by Hizbullah, Iran’s local proxy, in some cases at the same time as Iranian missiles, are an additional menace.

Even so, Israel and the Gulf countries claim to have intercepted most of the Iranian missiles in the first two weeks of the war. Those claims may not be entirely accurate. But there is no question that American and Israeli planes have made their task easier by significantly degrading Iran’s missile-launching capacities. The IDF claims that around 70% of Iran’s launchers have either been destroyed or are inaccessible in underground hideouts. However, that still leaves Iran with more than 100 launchers, out of an estimated 400 when the war began.

Other countries in the region may begin to adopt Israeli procedures for civilian defence; but that will take years to implement. In the meantime they can expect to spend a lot of money on interceptors to replace those used in this war and prepare for the next. A single Arrow interceptor is estimated to cost around $2m. Gulf countries, in particular, may have to be patient. Production is being ramped up: Israeli and American contractors have set up new assembly lines for Arrow and Iron Dome interceptors, but will want to replenish their own stocks first. A new Patriot assembly line in Germany is expected to begin production at the end of the year, but will mainly serve Ukraine and other European countries. In the long term, Gulf countries will probably have to develop capabilities that are less dependent on outside suppliers.

In the immediate future none of that will help. The launch rate of Iranian missiles has dwindled in recent days, but the attacks have not ceased. As the war drags on, it is becoming a question of who runs out first: Iran of ballistic missiles, or its adversaries of interceptors. America and Israel are betting they have destroyed enough missile-launchers for the answer to be in their favour. ■