Are Gulf states running out of missile interceptors?

IN THE FIRST Gulf war in 1991 Saddam Hussein fired 42 missiles at Israel and 46 at Saudi Arabia. By recent standards, that was a light sprinkling. Iran has fired more than 300 ballistic missiles at Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) combined in the first three days of the latest war. It has launched another couple of hundred at other Arab states. All those countries claim to have intercepted most of these. Cities like Dubai now shake daily with the thud of interceptions above. But that is putting a huge strain on their stocks of interceptor missiles. How long can they last?

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), a six-nation club, bristles with modern air defences. Five of the six countries—Oman is the exception—operate the American-made Patriot system, which is equipped to handle ballistic missiles. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, at least, also have the PAC-3 MSE interceptor, which can fly farther, higher and more nimbly than earlier variants. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also operate the Terminal High Altitude Air Defence System (THAAD), another American-made battery which can intercept even longer-range missiles at very high altitudes. Below those sit a series of mostly older short- and medium-range systems that are designed to intercept drones and planes.

Air-defence operators tend to fire at least two interceptors per incoming missile, to be sure of a kill (drones are a separate problem: they are mostly shot down by planes and by low-cost interceptors, rather than the scarce and expensive ones used for ballistic missiles). Iran has fired around 400 ballistic missiles at Arab states, though Saudi Arabia does not publish numbers. A crude estimate would therefore suggest that Arab countries might have burned through around 800 PAC-3 or THAAD interceptors in a couple of days. In comparison, America used just 158 Patriot interceptors over six weeks in the first Gulf war.

In practice, not every single incoming missile would be targeted—some would have been deemed to be headed for water or open ground. Nor does the 800 figure account for American batteries deployed to the region in recent weeks, which are also likely to be engaging targets. In last year’s 12-day war between Israel and Iran, for instance, America is thought to have used more than 150 THAAD interceptors and around 80 SM-3s, which are fired from destroyers.

There is no reliable data on how many interceptors these Arab states had to begin with. On March 3rd Qatar and the UAE strongly denied claims that they were running low. “The inventory of Patriot interceptor missiles held by the Qatar Armed Forces has not been depleted and remains well-stocked,” wrote Qatar. Countries treat stockpile figures as state secrets, because publishing them would allow an adversary to calculate precisely how many missiles and how long it would take to overwhelm batteries.

Documents published by America’s Defense Security Co-operation Agency suggest that the UAE may have ordered more than 1,000 PAC-3 (and older) interceptors over the past 15 years, but that would still represent only a few days of current consumption. America is probably replenishing some of these stocks, but it also has to decide whether it is willing to denude its forces in the Pacific, which must reckon with enormous Chinese missile arsenals, and divert supplies from European allies, who want to buy interceptors to give to Ukraine.

Annual production rates offer other clues. Lockheed Martin produces around 600 PAC-3 interceptors per year (it hopes to scale that up to around 2,000 over the next seven years). THAAD production is even more anaemic. Lockheed wants to increase production to 400 interceptors per year, but the current annual rate is said to be around 96. In other words, Arab countries are probably using more interceptors each day or two than America can churn out each year. A war that stretches for longer than a week is likely to place huge stress on stockpiles. Countries would need to ration their interceptors, perhaps choosing which sites to defend and which to leave exposed.

But any calculation also needs to consider the other side of the equation. Iran was thought to have 2,500 or so ballistic missiles, of all ranges, going into the war. At the initial rate of fire, they would be depleted in a week. There are some signs that Iran, by choice, or because its launchers are being hunted, slowed down the rate of fire against Israel and the Gulf states on March 2nd and 3rd, with the UAE reporting just 21 additional missiles between March 1st and March 3rd. Iranian officials claim they are saving their best missiles for later in the war, once Gulf or Israeli air defences have been denuded. But Iran’s missile stockpiles and launchers are also being systematically destroyed by America and Israel. That could even up the contest between missiles and interceptors, buying more time for the Gulf.

The number of interceptors is not the only factor determining the efficacy of a country’s missile defences. The off-the-shelf systems operated by Gulf countries, in contrast to Israel’s specialised batteries, may not be ideally suited to the threats.  Defences also depend on radar and tracking systems, both ground- and satellite-based, to boost the interceptor’s accuracy. “These countries have bought missile-defence systems which may not be best for their purposes, and relied upon them, instead of building a comprehensive national missile-defence plan with all the elements,” argues former Brigadier-General Ran Kochav, who used to command Israel’s missile-defence corps. Poor integration is one reason Saudi defences have performed worse than Qatari ones, notes one Gulf official with knowledge of the data.

There have been some reports that Gulf states are getting twitchy, urging America to stop the war for fear that their cities and infrastructure could be destroyed. In fact, Gulf officials seem remarkably bullish in private and show little sign of opposing one of Donald Trump’s stated war aims: to “raze their missile industry to the ground”. ■