“Complete change of regime” in Hungary

AS SOON AS it was clear that Viktor Orban had lost Hungary’s election on April 12th, crowds swarmed into Budapest’s streets, slowing cars and high-fiving the passengers. Gergo stood outside a bar, waving a bottle of champagne and cheering. Drivers honked back in a four-beat pattern, mimicking the chants of mocskos Fidesz (filthy Fidesz, Mr Orban’s party) and Ruszkik haza (Russians go home). “It feels like we have been under a heavy blanket for 16 years [since Fidesz came to power], and it just got lifted,” said Gergo.

There was never any doubt that Budapest, a liberal metropolis, would vote for Peter Magyar and his opposition Tisza party. But his victory was broad. Rural regions in the east and south went for Mr Magyar, too, fed up with corroding social services and an economy that has barely grown since the EU blocked aid over corruption concerns in 2022. Tisza ended up beating Fidesz by some 52% to 40% (see map). Our Homeland, an ultra-nationalist party, sneaked into parliament with 6%.

The day after the celebrations, in a three-hour press conference, Mr Magyar vowed to reverse Mr Orban’s takeover of the state and to root out and punish the systematic graft that has made Hungary the most corrupt country in the EU according to watchdogs. “The Hungarian people voted not for a simple change of government, but for a complete change of regime,” Mr Magyar said. “This country was held hostage. It was a captured state.”

That capture was long in the making. Mr Orban used Fidesz’s two-thirds majority in parliament to alter Hungary’s constitution in his favour, and to stuff the civil service and independent institutions with apparatchiks. Mr Magyar wants to cleanse the system quickly to avoid the fate of Poland’s Donald Tusk, who has struggled to restore the rule of law since defeating his country’s populists in 2023. He has demanded the resignations of Fidesz officials including the president, the heads of the supreme and constitutional courts and the chief prosecutor. If they do not leave, he will try to use his two-thirds majority to oust them; preliminary counts give Tisza 137 of the 199 seats. But the president must sign legislation, making that difficult.

The prime minister-elect plans to reform the constitution Fidesz distorted, after some form of popular consultation. He wants a two-term limit for prime ministers, which would block Mr Orban from running again. He will also need to unwind what Mr Orban called the System of National Co-operation, which put cronies in charge of universities and state-owned firms (such as MOL, the state energy company), and created Fidesz-friendly media foundations and think-tanks. Mr Magyar says he will end subsidies for outfits such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium Foundation, which put Budapest at the centre of the global populist movement.

Undoing media distortion may be easier than it seems. Vast government advertising spending on Fidesz-friendly outfits will now end. Independent outlets that uncovered corruption, such as Telex and 444.hu, will gain a level playing field.

Indeed, Mr Orban’s governing machine is already cracking. Hungarians were amused to see the state broadcaster transmit Mr Magyar’s entire press conference, after refusing to cover him during the campaign except in hostile clips. “The system is very quickly falling apart,” says Botond Feledy of Red Snow, a risk-analysis firm. Before the election there were anecdotal reports of people taking Fidesz-linked wealth out of the country, and a number of businessmen and civil servants defected to Tisza. Should loyalists lose confidence that Mr Orban can return, they may reveal details of corruption under his rule.

The new government’s priority is to unlock the blocked EU funds, currently worth around €18bn ($21bn), or nearly 10% of GDP. Officials in Brussels are well disposed towards Mr Magyar (not least since he promised to lift Mr Orban’s veto on a €90bn loan for Ukraine), but want a clear plan to restore the rule of law, to ensure money is not spent corruptly. Much of the aid comes from the EU’s post-covid recovery plan, and will expire at the end of August. It would reduce debt and help lower interest rates, which are now four percentage points higher than in the euro zone. Economists think this could raise the growth rate by a percentage point or more.

For the EU, Mr Orban’s departure is an enormous relief. Hungary had become Vladimir Putin’s ally inside the bloc, vetoing sanctions and aid to Ukraine in exchange for cheap Russian energy. (Russia sent social-media operatives to aid Fidesz, but that may have hurt more than it helped.) Mr Magyar is less likely to reverse Hungary’s friendly stance towards China, which has huge battery and electric-vehicle investments in the country.

Fidesz’s defeat is also a blow to its MAGA allies. Donald Trump promised to back Hungary with America’s “full economic might” if Mr Orban won. Other European populists may conclude that Mr Trump is now a hindrance rather than a help.

Mr Orban can stay in office until May 12th. For many the test of the next administration will be whether it prosecutes those who illicitly enriched themselves under Fidesz. Hungary had one of the Soviet bloc’s softest transitions after communism, and its failure to punish the guilty tarnished later governments. Many voted for Tisza to end the pattern of corruption. Mr Magyar promises never to allow “government without accountability”—a pledge that resonates far beyond Hungary. ■