Reform UK is reassembling Boris Johnson’s electoral coalition

“I liked Boris,” says Linda, a small-business owner in Wymondham, Norfolk. She refers to the former prime minister, Boris Johnson, by his mononym. “I think he was working for England.”

If Mr Johnson’s style of conservatism has a heartland, it might be Norfolk. In 2019, under his leadership, the Conservative Party won its highest-ever share of the vote (58%) in the county, on England’s eastern hump. The clownish former journalist was backed by traditional Tories, in rural towns like Wymondham, working-class voters in declining industrial areas like Great Yarmouth, and suburbanites in Norwich—the county’s only city.

Seven years on, Linda is considering voting for Reform UK. Five years of flailing government resulted in the Conservatives’ landslide defeat in 2024. From the ashes, Nigel Farage is assembling a remarkably similar voter base to Mr Johnson’s. According to The Economist’s tracker of national opinion polls, Reform’s support stands at around 25%. It could win more than 2,000 of the 5,000 council seats up for election on May 7th, when around half of the English electorate have the chance to vote.

According to the British Election Study, conducted in May 2025, almost two-thirds of Reform supporters voted Conservative in 2019 (see chart 1). Even among voters who supported Labour in 2024 and now say they would vote Reform (a group that looms large in the minds of Labour MPs), just as many voted for Mr Johnson’s Tories as for Labour in 2019.

So, who are these voters? The Economist analysed over 37,000 survey responses collected by More in Common, a pollster, between January and April 2026 to find out. Just like Mr Johnson’s voters in 2019, Reform’s supporters tend to be less educated, middle-aged or older and white. They view themselves as working-class (although some are wealthy). Almost three-quarters voted to leave the European Union in 2016.

To chart the trajectory of these voters, it is helpful to remember the fate of Mr Johnson. The Tories picked him as leader and prime minister in July 2019 at the height of Britain’s deadlock over Brexit, to fend off Mr Farage’s Brexit Party (a predecessor of Reform). It worked. Mr Johnson won the election in December 2019, broke the impasse and took Britain out of the EU.

Unfortunately, the Tories hadn’t planned much beyond that point. During the covid-19 pandemic Mr Johnson was revealed to be partying in Number 10, in breach of lockdown law. His premiership quickly turned to farce, punctuated by absurd stories (such as his “ambush” with a birthday cake) and ham-fisted manoeuvring. He was replaced in September 2022 by Liz Truss, whose disastrous premiership lasted only 49 days, and finally by Rishi Sunak, who could not save the Tories from a crushing defeat in July 2024.

Mr Johnson’s legacy is a gift to Mr Farage. For one, there is the immigration issue—Reform’s raison d’être. In 2019 Mr Johnson’s voters understood that a vote for him was a vote to get Brexit done. The cause was practically synonymous with reducing immigration. Instead, net migration soared to a peak of 944,000 in the year leading up to March 2023 (compared with 184,000 in the year ending December 2019). Under Mr Johnson small-boat arrivals across the Channel—a totemic issue for Reform—rose to a high of almost 50,000 in a year. According to Ipsos, a pollster, the number of people who said immigration was one of their top issues jumped from 14% in December 2019 to 51% in September 2025. Reform’s support grew in parallel.

At the same time, Britain’s public services degraded. Hospital waiting lists rose during the pandemic and remained high. Local councils scrambled to avoid bankruptcy and social care suffered as a result. Voters struggled to book GP appointments. Labour won the 2024 election largely on the back of dissatisfaction with public services (as well as anger with the Tories). A recent paper by academics at the London School of Economics, University of Oxford and IE University suggests that voters in areas where GP practices closed between 2013 and 2023—particularly those with high levels of immigration—were more likely to turn to the populist right.

If Mr Johnson’s voters supported him in 2019 out of impatience with other politicians, they are exasperated now. “I’m not really interested in excuses,” says Frank, a pensioner in Wymondham. “I think [the Tories] had the right ideas—more so than Labour—but they couldn’t do it!” He is now considering Reform. One refrain comes up from the Reform-curious: “We’ve tried the Conservatives, we’ve tried Labour, why not Reform?” Britons are fair-minded. Perhaps it is Mr Farage’s turn.

The influx of former Tories means Reform now represents two distinct types of voter. The core (perhaps 10-15% of voters overall) is truly radical. They tend to be favourable towards Donald Trump, sympathetic to some of the rioters who trashed English cities in August 2024 and incensed about immigration. Bill, a Reform supporter in Wymondham, describes climate change as “the biggest hoax the world has ever seen” and fears that “the establishment” will prevent a Reform government taking office. He says of Labour: “They called me racist and a pig.” (He does not elaborate on who called him a pig.)

The second, larger group more closely resembles the 2019 Conservatives. They too are anti-immigration—especially worried about small boats—but they are also motivated by other concerns. “I just think [Reform is] more focused on protecting businesses, especially small businesses,” says Linda. Frank worries about the number of people on welfare. Like the core supporters they worry about Britain’s decline, but they do not think the country’s institutions should “burn”—a position that 17% of Reform supporters strongly agree with. Just as in 2019, they want to elect a government that allows them to think less about politics, not turn it on its head.

If Mr Farage wants to be prime minister, he will have to keep these new supporters happy. They won’t tolerate the sort of upheaval that Mr Trump unleashed on America and Mr Farage’s radical streak could scare them off. The party has watered down tax cuts and spending pledges that might spook bond markets. It has endorsed the triple-lock on state-funded pensions (which guarantees they will rise as fast as wages, inflation or 2.5% each year, whichever is highest), signalling to its elderly base that Reform is a safe choice.

Still, the path to power is not assured. Reform’s current 25% is far from the 45% that Mr Johnson scored in 2019. The rump Tory support—polling at around 19%—is more stubborn than Mr Farage might have hoped. Among Reform’s weak points compared with Mr Johnson’s 2019 numbers are ethnic minorities, pensioners, homeowners and women (see chart 2).

Some voters in Wymondham like Reform’s policies but dislike Mr Farage. “If he got into power, I don’t think he’d have a clue what to do,” says Sandra, a Tory supporter. Another calls him “a bloody nutcase”. Since September, Reform’s national poll numbers have slipped by around five percentage points.

Mr Farage’s u-turn over Iran didn’t help. After suggesting that the government should join America’s war, his instinct to align with Mr Trump came up against public opinion. “I do wonder about his relationship with the USA, and especially Trump,” says Linda. Only 13% of Britons describe themselves as “pro-Trump” (70% say Reform is a pro-Trump party). Plenty of issues might drive a similar wedge between Reform’s more and less radical elements. Mr Farage’s opponents will no doubt seek to exploit them.

Even so, the upstart party has led most polls for a year now—the first to ever dislodge Labour and the Conservatives in sustained polling. The local elections are bound to bring it good news. When most council seats were last contested, in 2022, Reform was polling at just 4%. To see how the game on the right is changing, keep your eyes on Norfolk. ■