A friend in need
In the Gulf, Ukraine flaunts its skill at intercepting drones
April 16, 2026
SOON AFTER launching his assault on Iran, Donald Trump snubbed Ukraine. “We don’t need their help in drone defence,” Mr Trump told Fox News. “We have the best drones in the world, actually.”
The Gulf states, under attack by Iranian missiles and Shahed drones, took a different view. At their request, Ukraine rapidly sent them 228 advisers with battle-tested experience in drone defence. In late March Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, toured the region and signed ten-year security partnerships with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ukraine is also working with Jordan and Kuwait.
The agreements are a recognition that Ukrainian expertise, after four years of a war that has involved attacks by up to 1,000 Russian drones in one night, far exceeds anything that America and the rest of Europe can offer. Ukraine’s defence firms have honed the mass production of interceptors that cost $2,000-5,000 each. These are now taking out up to 90% of the $50,000 Russian Geran-2 drones (an improved version of the Iranian Shaheds) that are launched at Ukrainian cities.
The cost differential is critical. The Gulf states have extensive air defences, but it is absurd to shoot down slow-moving Shaheds with Patriot interceptors costing $4m each or $500,000 air-launched AIM-9X Sidewinders. These should be reserved, respectively, for taking out ballistic and cruise missiles, which move too fast for drones to hit. The Ukrainians, says Tom Waldwyn of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think-tank, have become proficient at matching the shooter to the target. They are helped by the AI-enabled battlefield-management system they have developed, known as Delta.
It will take time for Gulf states to build the arrays of sensors needed to thwart large-scale attacks. But the Ukrainians have taught them vital lessons in making sense of the data from detection systems, says Nico Lange, a former chief of staff at the German defence ministry. “What Ukraine brought to the table immediately worked,” he says. For Ukraine, stopping the few drones that Iran has been reduced to launching each day would be something “they can do with their eyes shut”.
Some secrecy still surrounds the deals. Co-production of air-defence systems and partnerships between government-approved Ukrainian defence firms and Gulf counterparts are expected. Ukrainian companies will get a welcome injection of cash and new orders.
Offers of financing have begun to pour in, say industry insiders. The war has sparked “huge interest” in Ukrainian drone interceptors among the Gulf states, says Oleksiy Honcharuk, of Uforce, which recently became Ukraine’s first defence-technology unicorn. Such partnerships provide “new cards” for a country told by Mr Trump that it had none, says Ihor Semyvolos, a Ukrainian analyst.
The Ukrainian government sees the deals in long-term geopolitical terms. Mr Zelensky is eager to export “our system of protection, the skills of our warriors, the knowledge that our state possesses”. There will be immediate gains too, Mr Lange reckons, such as Qatar’s transfer of 12 Mirage fighter jets and diesel. What matters most, says Andryi Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister who chairs the Centre for Defence Studies, a think-tank, is that countries see Ukraine not as a supplicant but as a valuable security partner.
Ukrainian arms firms will increasingly branch out into exports, says Mr Waldwyn, especially if the war with Russia winds down. They will need to find new customers to maintain scale. But even now, co-production outside Ukraine has benefits. Much of what Ukraine produces relies on dual-use parts, many of them from China. China withholds some technologies from Ukraine that it happily sells to Russia. But China relies on Gulf Arab countries for half its oil imports. It is likely to sell them anything they want for systems they co-produce with Ukraine.
Europe is waking up to the benefits, too. In 2025 European and Ukrainian companies signed more than 20 agreements, nearly twice the number signed in 2023 (see chart). In February four Ukrainian defence manufacturers launched joint ventures with firms from Denmark, Finland and Latvia. And the European Commission has approved a $1.7bn programme to integrate Ukraine’s defence industry with Europe’s.
But Europe’s sclerotic defence ministries and traditional arms companies may not be culturally ready for what Ukraine offers. Mr Waldwyn says they still think in terms of 30-year programmes with burdensome regulatory processes. In contrast to Ukraine, where products that do not work in combat are quickly binned, there is little connection between those buying the kit and those who will use it.
That gap was highlighted by Armin Papperger, the boss of Rheinmetall, Germany’s biggest arms-maker, in a condescending interview on March 27th with the Atlantic, an American magazine. Mr Papperger likened Ukrainian drone technology to “playing with Lego”, saying it was produced by “housewives” who “have 3-D printers in their kitchens”. The backlash came fast. Rheinmetall apologised, calling Ukraine’s “innovative strength and fighting spirit” a “source of inspiration”. Mr Papperger’s remarks may have been a misguided marketing ploy to demean competitors. His own company’s pricey Skyranger anti-drone system, which has been ordered by the German army, is running many months behind schedule. ■
Correction (April 14th 2026): An earlier version of this article incorrectly referred to the number of agreements signed in 2024. It should have stated 2023.
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