The Caracas condition
Donald Trump has made Venezuela a better place
April 16, 2026
Before its strongman leader, Nicolás Maduro, was captured by American special forces on January 3rd, Venezuela was a grim, hopeless place. His regime silenced critics and stole elections. Some opposition politicians were killed, tortured or thrown into jail. The economy had collapsed; 8m people had fled. The notion of Venezuela spontaneously becoming more open or prosperous seemed too much to hope for.
But in the 100 days since Mr Maduro’s seizure, Venezuela has changed for the better. Opposition politicians, many only just released from prison, are meeting openly. Protests are no longer routinely suppressed. Investors are sniffing around oil, gas and mining assets. Delcy Rodríguez, previously Mr Maduro’s deputy, is running the country to Donald Trump’s liking, albeit under the threat of violence if she fails to comply.
None of this would have happened without Mr Trump. But the president is muddled about what Venezuela shows, in two important ways. The first is that he talks about the country’s transformation as though it were complete, speaking of how “Venezuela has worked out so incredibly”. The second is that he holds Venezuela up as a model for regime change. “What we did in Venezuela”, Mr Trump said in March, when asked about his plans for Iran, “I think is the perfect, the perfect scenario.” On both counts he is wrong.
For one thing, Venezuela’s positive transformation is only limited so far. It will not be secure until democracy has been rekindled. Foreign investment will not pour in at the scale needed while the rule of law is backed only by Mr Trump’s word that he will keep the regime’s cronies in line. What’s more, having had their hopes dramatically raised, Venezuelans will bridle without more progress away from dictatorship. Those jails still hold some 480 political prisoners. Investors want stability; delaying elections will eventually cause unrest.
The return of democracy is a possibility. However, the path towards it is narrow and murky and, without sustained American pressure, it may vanish altogether. It probably requires María Corina Machado, leader of the opposition, to return to Venezuela and campaign for elections. After she was barred from standing in the presidential vote in 2024, Venezuelans voted overwhelmingly for her political ally, Edmundo González; Mr Maduro pretended he had won. This time, Venezuelans may have to take to the streets at the same time as seeking negotiations with those in power.
The threat of his big foreign-policy success being marred by protesters angrily demanding change may motivate Mr Trump to press for elections. Marco Rubio, his Cuban-American secretary of state, also has staked much on Venezuela’s success, including his own presidential ambitions. But the long game is hardly a Trumpian strength. Besides, Ms Rodríguez will surely seek to string things out, hoping that Mr Trump will lose interest. The temptation for America to trade democratic delay for short-term stability will be strong.
Even if Mr Trump and his officials can nurture a democratic Venezuela, his methods are not easily reproduced elsewhere. The Venezuelan regime was uniquely vulnerable to Mr Trump’s transactional approach, because it has long been corrupt and ideology-free. Mr Maduro was no more than the gangster-in-chief. By removing him, Mr Trump helped others profit more. With few shared beliefs beyond grabbing power and money, it cost them little to fall in line with America. Venezuela’s history of democracy and its robust political opposition also aided Mr Trump, by giving Venezuelans a group apart from the regime to rally around. Most interpreted Mr Maduro’s seizure narrowly, as an attack on a hated dictator.
Contrast this with Mr Trump’s failed attempts to topple the regime in Iran. The strike at the start of the war that killed Ali Khamenei, the country’s supreme leader, prompted the rest of the regime in Tehran to close ranks and fight back. However corrupt and self-serving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may be, a shared ideology helps prevent the regime from fracturing. By contrast, Ms Rodríguez’s deal with America was consistent with the self-serving values of Mr Maduro.
Iran’s regime is far more powerful than the one in Venezuela. But even tiny Cuba has so far held out against Mr Trump’s aggression. For 66 years the island has been run by the Castro family, who are true believers in communism regardless of the country’s corruption. Neither the regime in Cuba nor that in Iran faces an organised domestic political opposition.
Mr Trump sees ideology as weakness. He thinks making money is all that really counts. If he keeps following the model he stumbled into in Venezuela, reality will prove him wrong. ■
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